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European Forum 
The European Forum was set up by the High Council of the EUI in 1992 with the mission of bringing 
together at the Institute, for a given academic year, a group of experts to conduct comparative and 
interdisciplinary research on a specific topic, which is chosen annually, under the supervision of 
annual scientific director(s). 
This Working Paper has been written in the context of the 2003-2004 European Forum programme on 
‘Constitutionalism in Europe’, the overall direction and coordination of which was carried out by 
Professor Bruno de Witte, with Dr. Miriam Aziz as the scientific coordinator. 
In order to preserve a clear focus within this broad theme, the scope of the Forum was limited to four 
distinct but complementary themes, each of which had its own coordinator. Theme 1: ‘The Idea and 
the Dynamics of the European Constitution’ was coordinated by Professor Neil Walker; Theme 2: 
‘The ‘East’ Side of European Constitutionalism’ was coordinated by Professor Wojciech Sadurski; 
Theme 3: ‘The Constitutional Accommodation of Regional and Cultural Diversity’ was coordinated 
by Professor Michael Keating; and Theme 4: ‘The Market and Countervailing Social Values in the 
Constitution of Europe’ was coordinated by Professor Martin Rhodes. Abstract 
Normative discourses on the European institutional set-up have paid attention to both vertical and 
horizontal decentralism. Decentralism refers to the respect of the autonomy of lower or smaller decision-
making levels, the procedures privileging these decision-making levels (subsidiarity), and the 
involvement of these decision-making units in the case that policy-making is (partially) defined (and 
implemented) at a more central level. Vertical decentralism indicates these processes with regard to 
territorial decision-making levels and actors. Horizontal decentralism consists in these processes with 
regard to functional levels and actors, in particular civil society organisations and private organisations. 
This paper argues that the vertical and horizontal dimension of decentralism have always been dealt 
with separately within the European constitutional debate. For long, the debate has focused on issues 
of territorial representation, and as far as it has paid attention to decentralism this has been interpreted 
in vertical terms. It is only by the end of the 1990s that the normative discourse on the European 
construction starts also to pay attention to horizontal decentralism. However, normative arguments on 
vertical decentralism meet hardly ever with those on horizontal decentralism, as can still be illustrated 
by the current constitutional debate, with the Convention-Constitutional Treaty debate on the one 
hand, and the (follow-up to the) White Paper on European Governance on the other hand. Institutional 
interests may explain this separation of discourses.  
However, in practice European governance is characterised by interactions between public and 
private actors at multiple territorial levels. Therefore, the vertical and the horizontal dimensions of 
decentralism are intertwined. As a consequence, the normative debate on the future of the European 
polity should not deal with these issues in complete isolation from one another. 
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1. Introduction* 
In particular since the 1990s, Community discourses and institutional reflections have made reference 
to ideas of subsidiarity, partnership, dialogue, decentralisation, participation and autonomy of lower or 
smaller decision-making levels or units. These normative discourses on ‘decentralism’ have been 
applied to multi-level governance in territorial terms (European, national, regional and local level) and 
to the role of civil society and private organisations in European governance. 
I will use in this paper ‘decentralism’ as an encompassing term to avoid the connotations of more 
established concepts in the European governance debate, such as subsidiarity or partnership. 
Decentralism refers to the respect of the autonomy of lower or smaller decision-making levels, the 
procedures privileging these decision-making levels (subsidiarity), and the involvement of these 
decision-making units in the case that policy-making is (partially) defined (and implemented) at a 
more central level.  Vertical decentralism indicates these processes with regard to territorial decision-
making levels and actors. Horizontal decentralism consists in these processes with regard to functional 
levels and actors, in particular civil society organisations and private organisations.
1 The concept of 
‘decentralism’ is preferred to that of ‘decentralisation’ which has been more commonly identified with 
processes of administrative or political reform from more central to more decentralised State 
structures. ‘Decentralism’ does not assume the existence of a centralised polity which is then reformed in 
a decentralising way, but refers to the normative encouraging of decentralising processes taking an 
abstract centralised public authority (in our case at the European level) as reference point. Decentralism 
is part of the normative institutional debate that we are used to describe as constitutionalism. It refers to 
the normative favouring of the autonomy and competence of lower or smaller units, as well as their 
involvement in more central decision-making.
2 It is thus a very broad concept and, as this paper will 
show, not all its aspects need to be (equally) part of the European constitutional debate.
3 
                                                      
*  I would like to thank the Forum participants, in particular Michael Keating, for their comments, as well as two 
anonymous referees. 
1   Concepts such as interest groups, NGOs, civil society organisations, profit and non-profit organisations are used with different 
connotations.  In certain cases, discourses on horizontal decentralism are aimed to apply to some of them and not to others.   
2    It may be useful here to indicate how vertical and horizontal decentralism relate to the two types of multi-level 
governance identified by L. Hooghe and G. Marks, 2002. ‘Types of Multi-Level Governance’, Cahiers Européens de 
Sciences Po, No. 2002/3. Hooghe and Marks (p. 8) describe Type I multi-level governance as a limited number of general 
purpose jurisdictions at a limited number of levels—international, national, regional, meso, local. They bundle together 
multiple functions, including a range of policy responsibilities, and in many cases, a court system a representative 
institutions. The boundaries of such jurisdictions do not intersect and these territorial jurisdictions are intended to be, and 
usually are, stable for periods of several decades or more, though the allocation of policy competencies across 
jurisdictional levels is flexible. Type II multi-level governance is composed of specialized jurisdictions. The number of 
such functionally specific jurisdictions is potentially huge, the scales at which they operate vary finely and there is no 
great fixity in their existence. One can argue that vertical decentralism favours Type I multi-level governance. Yet, there 
is no necessary relation between horizontal decentralism and Type II multi-level governance. For sure, when horizontal 
decentralism favours the autonomy of private actors and functional subsidiarity this will contribute to an increase of 
functionally specific jurisdictions and to Type II multi-level governance. Yet, horizontal decentralism might also merely 
favour the participation of civil society actors in public decision-making, which can perfectly be realised in Type I multi-
level governance. The other way around, the concept of Type II multi-level governance does not necessarily imply 
horizontal decentralism. Functionally specific jurisdictions may be limited to public authorities. As Hooghe and Marks 
argue, we can think about a ‘governance system where each citizen […] is served not by ‘the’ government, but by a 
variety of different public service industries’ (p. 11). It would be difficult, though, to imagine a Type II multi-level 
governance with many functionally specific pieces if not part of such functionally defined jurisdictions were private 
rather than public governance structures. However, while Hooghe and Marks ‘recognize the significance of 
distinguishing between public and private actors’ this dimension is said to be ‘orthogonal’ to their own dichotomy. 
Vertical-horizontal decentralism should thus not be identified with Type I and Type II multi-level governance. In addition 
to the fact that horizontal decentralism takes the public-private divide as central focus, the idea of decentralism is more 
related to the level of normative discourse, whereas the concepts of Hooghe and Marks are primarily of an analytical Stijn Smismans 
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Normative discourses on the European institutional set-up have paid attention to both vertical and 
horizontal decentralism. Yet, the main aim of this paper is to indicate how these two dimensions of 
decentralism have always been dealt with separately.  Section 2 of this paper analyses how the 
(institutional) discourses on vertical and horizontal decentralism have developed. It looks for an 
explanation for the dichotomous nature of the discourse and analyses how this two-track approach is 
still present in the current constitutional debate. Section 3 confronts this normative debate with the 
reality of European governance. In practice, European governance is characterised by interactions 
between public and private actors at multiple territorial levels. Therefore, the vertical and the 
horizontal dimensions of decentralism are intertwined. As a consequence, the normative debate on the 
future of the European polity should not deal with these issues in complete isolation from one another. 
2. Decentralism and the Two-Track Normative Debate on EU Legitimacy 
Although the issue of the ‘democratic deficit of the EC/EU’ is not a recent entrant on the European 
political agenda,
4 it has gained particularly in importance since the end of the 1980s. The debate has 
focused on issues of territorial representation, and as far as it has paid attention to decentralism this 
has been interpreted in vertical terms (2.1.). It is only by the end of the 1990s that the normative 
discourse on the European construction starts also to pay attention to horizontal decentralism, as is 
exemplified in the governance debate (2.2.). However, normative arguments on vertical decentralism 
meet hardly ever with those on horizontal decentralism, as can still be illustrated by the current 
constitutional debate (2.4.). Institutional interests may explain this separation of discourses (2.3.).  
2.1. The Democratic Deficit Debate and Vertical Decentralism 
As long as the EC/EU could be considered a ‘special purpose association’,
5 to which a limited amount 
of well-defined functions were delegated, the ‘centre’ of the European construction was not developed 
enough to make ‘decentralism’ a normative concern.  With the steady increase of decision-making 
power at the European level, the initial concern about the ‘democratic deficit’ of the EC focused on the 
need for popular involvement via the European Parliament, to be directly elected. The parliamentary 
model has been the dominant normative framework to think about the legitimacy of the European 
polity,
6 leading gradually to increased powers for the European Parliament; namely, budgetary and 
legislative powers, and control over the Commission. However, while the political discourse on 
democratic involvement has been most explicit with regard to the European Parliament, the direct 
parliamentary representation of European citizens at the European level has always been 
counterbalanced by the remaining central position of the Member States in the European construction. 
This ‘decentralist concern’ finds expression in the important role of the Council of Ministers, and 
more recently the formalisation of the role of the European Council. With the gradual increase of the 
co-decision procedure and the strengthening of the Parliament’s position in that procedure the EU 
comes ever closer to a bicameral parliamentary democracy,
7 close to the institutional system of a 
(Contd.)                                                                   
nature. Yet, as far as this paper will confront the European constitutional discourse with the reality of European 
governance, and as far as Hooghe and Marks also link their concepts to normative biases, the analyses will partially meet.  
3   In particular it will result from this paper that the idea of horizontal decentralism has been defined mainly in terms of the 
participation of civil society and private actors into (more) central European policy-making, whereas the recognition of 
the autonomy of private governance mechanisms or functional subsidiarity has been nearly entirely absent in the debate. 
4   R. Hrbek, 1995. ‘Federal Balance and the Problem of Democratic Legitimacy in the EU’, Aussenwirtschaft, 50, p. 63. 
5   H. P. Ipsen,1972. Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht. Tubingen: Mohr, p. 176. 
6    R. Dehousse, 1998. ‘European Institutional Architecture after the Amsterdam Treaty: Parliamentary or Regulatory 
Structure?’, Common Market Law Review, 35, p.598. 
7    N. Nentwich, and G. Falkner, 1997. ‘The Treaty of Amsterdam: Towards a New Institutional Balance’, European 
Integration online Papers, 1 (15), p. 1; available at: http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-015a.htm The EU’s Schizophrenic Constitutional Debate: Vertical and Horizontal Decentralism in European Governance. 
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number of federal countries, in which the legislative power is shared by two branches, representing the 
population of the Union and its Member States respectively.
8 
Moreover, the execution of European policy is above all assured by the Member States (and thus by 
the national administrations) rather than by the centralised European administration of the Commission. 
Even when European legislation is implemented by the Commission, ‘decentralism’ may be looked after 
via ‘comitology committees’ which ensure the participation of national administrations.  
However, while the European institutional set-up ensures a central position for the Member States 
in the Council, the increasing interference of the EU in more policy domains made clear that decision-
making tends to escape ever more from the democratic control of the national parliaments.
 9 Therefore, 
during the 1990s one has seen the development of a normative discourse of ‘vertical decentralism’ 
stressing the need to improve the role of national parliaments in European policy-making—a 
discourse, however, which (until now) has not led to substantial changes in the European institutional 
set-up and has mainly been dependent on the internal regulations of the Member States to increase the 
control of their parliament over their ministers in the Council.
10  
A comparable explicit normative discourse in favour of vertical decentralism had already been 
developed with regard to the role of regional and local authorities. The European integration process has 
in fact coincided in time with processes of decentralisation in many of its Member States, although its 
precise influence on these processes remains subject of debate. On the one hand, regional movements 
found in the European integration process a normative argument to justify a weakening of the bound 
with the nation-state (given that the regional level could fall-back on European intervention for supra-
regional policy questions).
11 European integration also encouraged the development of trans-frontier 
interregional co-operation. Moreover, in certain cases, European policy-making—in particular via the 
Structural Funds—has created direct interactions between the regional and the European level.
12 On the 
other hand, regional authorities have also felt the European integration process as an encroachment on 
the position they had already acquired within the national context.
13 As a consequence, in particular since 
the end of the 1980s, normative discourses on the legitimacy of the European construction have stressed 
the need to respect regional and local autonomy and to involve these actors in European policy-making 
                                                      
8   Dehousse, 1998, p. 606. 
9    Some have argued in this context that European integration has strengthened at national level the executive to the 
detriment of the parliament. See, A. Moravscik, 1994. Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic 
Politics and International Cooperation. Harvard University Center for European Studies Working Paper Series, No.52.  
10  On the failure of the Assises (a powerless congress of members of national parliaments together with members of the 
European Parliament) mentioned in a Declaration to the Maastricht Treaty, and the limits of the COSAC (Conférence des 
organes spécialisés dans les affaires communautaires, a biannual meeting of the organs in national parliaments 
responsible for European affairs along with a delegation from the European Parliament) enshrined in a Protocol of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, see G. Scoffoni, 1992. ‘Les rélations entre le Parlement européen et les parlements nationaux et le 
renforcement de la legitimité démocratique de la Communauté’, Cahiers de Droit Européen, pp. 22-41; M. Westlake, 
1995. ‘The European, the National Parliaments and the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference’, The Political Quarterly, 66, 
pp. 59-73; and S. Smismans, 1998. ‘The Role of the National Parliaments in the European Decision-Making Process: 
Addressing the Problem at the European Level?’, ELSA Selected Papers on European Law, IX (1), pp. 49-76. 
11  Yet the idea that decentralisation has led to ‘the hollowing out’ of the State has not been confirmed by strong empirical 
evidence. See H. Michel, 1998. ‘Government or Governance? The Case of the French Local Political System’, West 
European Politics, 21 (3), pp. 146-169. 
12    I. Tommel, 1997. ‘The EU and the Regions: Towards a Three-Tier system or new modes of regulation?’, Environment 
and Planning: Government and Policy, 15, p. 419. 
13  For a nuanced evaluation of the German case, see C. Jeffery, 1996. ‘Farewell the Third Level? The German Länder and 
the European Policy Process’, Regional and Federal Studies, 6, pp. 56-75. Stijn Smismans 
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This has led to the creation by the Maastricht Treaty of the Committee of the Regions and the possibility 
for Member States to be represented in the Council by a regional representative.
14  
The democratic deficit debate that characterised the intergovernmental conferences preparing the 
Maastricht and the Amsterdam Treaties has equally placed the principle of subsidiarity on the forefront. 
The origin of the concept of subsidiarity has commonly been attributed to Catholic social doctrine, where 
it was initially used in designing policy to fight poverty. State intervention, so it is argued, is only 
desirable in so far smaller social units, like the family, cannot do the job. Such (horizontal) subsidiarity is 
both meant to describe the means of protecting the sovereign sphere of smaller social groups, and to 
prevent the state from becoming ‘overloaded’ with demands from the lower and smaller social groups.
15 
However, such a horizontal interpretation of subsidiarity is entirely absent in the European debate where 
the concept has been defined in territorial terms, namely as a way to attribute competences to the best-
suited territorial level. As enshrined into the Treaty,
16 it has even been defined in more restrictive terms 
focusing on the relation between Community and Member States—with the exception of a Declaration 
attached to the Amsterdam Treaty which states that ‘for the German, Austrian and Belgian governments 
it remains understood that the actions of the European Community on the basis of the principle of 
subsidiarity concern not only the Member States, but also their bodies, to the extent that these bodies 
possess their own legislative powers, conferred on them by national constitutional law’.
17  
This exclusive focus on the territorial dimension of subsidiarity can be well understood if one looks to how 
the concept has found its way to the European level, namely it resulted on the one hand from the pressure 
from certain regions—in particular the German Lander—to use subsidiarity as a way to protect their regional 
autonomy recognised at the national level, and on the other hand from certain Member States—in particular 
the UK—that saw in subsidiarity a tool to protect themselves against creeping Community intervention.
18  
2.2. The Governance Debate and Horizontal Decentralism 
Whereas the democratic deficit debate has focused on issues of territorial representation and vertical 
decentralism, little normative attention has been paid to the role of interest groups or civil society 
organisations in European policy-making. There is a broad literature on lobbying in the European 
institutions, but this literature is of a descriptive nature. Neither the academic literature nor the 
political actors have looked to this reality from a normative angle. Put differently, for long the issue of 
the participation of interest groups or civil society organisations in European policy-making has not 
been integrated into the debate on the legitimacy of the EC/EU. 
However, there are good reasons to do so. First, because as the lobbying literature illustrates, 
interest groups play an important role in European policy-making. Moreover, in addition to ‘informal’ 
lobbying, the EC has from its inception provided several more institutionalised channels for interaction 
with interest groups or civil society organisations. The Rome Treaty, for instance created the advisory 
                                                      
14    Although these elements of regional involvement ‘did not figure very highly in the preoccupation of the Member States 
during the negotiations at Maastricht’ (Commissioner for regional policy, Bruce Millan, cited by, J. Loughlin, 1996. 
‘Representing Regions in Europe: The Committee of the Regions’, Regional & Federal Studies, 6 (2), p. 157). Pushed 
onto the agenda by the Belgian, Spanish and especially German regions/Länder, it became only ‘bon ton’ after the 
Maastricht Treaty to define regional involvement as a form of legitimacy providing participation. 
15  K. Van Kersbergen and B. Verbeek, 1994. ‘The Politics of Subsidiarity in the European Union’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 32 (2), p. 223. 
16  According to Article 5 EC Treaty ‘in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take 
action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiairity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, be better achieved by the Community.’ The Single Act contained already a reference to subsidiarity in the field of 
environmental policy (Art.130r(4)). 
17  See, however, below regarding the new provision on subsidiarity in the Constitutional Treaty. 
18  Van Kersbergen and Verbeek, 1994, p. 225. The EU’s Schizophrenic Constitutional Debate: Vertical and Horizontal Decentralism in European Governance. 
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Economic and Social Committee, composed of socio-economic organisations, mainly organisations 
representing employers, employees, consumers, third sector and agriculture. Interest group participation 
is thus not only a matter of fact but has been deliberately created in the European institutional set-up. 
Thinking about the legitimacy of the European institutions focusing only on territorial representation and 
ignoring elements of functional representation thus provides only part of the picture.  
Second, like the European integration process may have effects on the autonomy and role of 
decentralised territorial actors, this may also be the case for functional actors. German welfare 
organisations, for instance, have expressed the fear that more European intervention in social issues 
may threaten their acquired institutional position at the national level, which led to a Declaration 
added to the Maastricht Treaty stressing the importance, in pursuing the social objectives of the 
Treaty, of co-operation between the Community and charitable associations and foundations as 
institutions responsible for welfare establishments and services.
19 In particular in regard to the role of 
‘the social partners’, i.e. the organisations of management and labour, the influence of European 
integration on established industrial relations systems at the national (but also at the sectoral, firm and 
even regional) level cannot be underestimated and is only increasing due to monetary union.
20  
It was precisely in relation to the social partners that one has witnessed the development of an 
explicit normative discourse on ‘horizontal decentralism’, without, however, linking this discourse to 
the broader democracy and legitimacy debate of the EU. The first initiatives to institutionalise the role 
of the social partners at the European level trace back to the early 1970s but it was only in 1985 with 
the new Commission President, Jacques Delors, that the development of a ‘European social dialogue’ 
became a key element in the discourse on the need to develop ‘the European social dimension’.
21  This 
resulted in a Social Agreement added to the Maastricht Treaty, and subsequently integrated into the 
Amsterdam Treaty, constitutionalising several elements of ‘horizontal decentralism’, namely, respect 
for the autonomy of the social partners; a double consultation requirement and a procedure of 
horizontal subsidiarity in favour of the social partners.  
Article 137 para. 4 EC Treaty confirms the autonomy of the social partners at the national level: building 
on the case law of the ECJ,
22 it enables the Member States to leave the transposition of Directives in the 
social field to the social partners by way of national collective agreements, taking into account that the 
Member State ultimately retains responsibility for guaranteeing the objectives established by the Directives.  
Articles 138-139 constitutionalise a role for the social partners at the European level, including 
European collective agreements. According to Article 138 para.2 and 3 EC Treaty ‘before submitting 
proposals in the social policy field,
23 the Commission shall consult management and labour on the possible 
                                                      
19  J. Kendall and H. K. Anheier, 1999. ‘The Third Sector and the European Union Policy Process: An Initial Evaluation’, 
Journal of European Public Policy, 6 (2), p. 295. 
20   P. Teague, 2000. ‘Macroeconomic Constraints, Social Learning and Pay Bargaining in Europe’, British Journal of 
Industrial Relations, 38 (3), pp. 429-452; E. Traversa, 2000. ‘The Consequences of European Monetary Union on 
Collective Bargaining and the National Security Systems’, The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and 
Industrial Relations, 16 (1), pp. 47-54.  
21  For a good overview of the development of the social dialogue from the Tripartite Conferences in the 1970s over the Val 
Duchesse social dialogue to the Maastricht procedures, see M. J. Gorges, 1996. Euro-Corporatism? Interest 
Intermediation in the European Community. Lanham: Unity Press of America. 
22  ECJ, Case 91/81 Commission v. Italy [1982] ECR 723; Case 131/84 Commission v. Italy [1985] ECR 3531; Case 143/83 
Commission v. Denmark [1985] ECR 427. 
23  As results from Commission Communication on the social dialogue and from the consultation practice, the Commission 
interprets ‘proposals’ as proposals of a legislative nature. See Commission Communication concerning the Development 
of the Social Dialogue at Community Level, COM (1996) 448 final; and Commission communication on Adapting and 
promoting the Social Dialogue at Community Level, COM (1998) 322. On the other hand, ‘the social policy field’ is not 
interpreted in a restrictive way. The Commission ‚signalled the possibility of formal consultations on envisaged proposals 
for legislation of a horizontal or specific sectoral nature which have social implications, though, it reserved itself in these 
cases ‘the right to decide whether and how such consultation should be conducted.’ See COM (96) 448 final, Annex 1. Stijn Smismans 
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direction of Community action. If, after such consultation, the Commission considers Community action 
advisable, it shall consult management and labour on the content of the envisaged proposal. Management 
and labour shall forward to the Commission an opinion or, where appropriate, a recommendation.’
24 
At the occasion of this consultation the social partners may inform the Commission that they prefer 
to deal with the issue via bipartite negotiation, according to the procedure described in Article 139: 
‘1.Should management and labour so desire, the dialogue between them at Community level may 
lead to contractual relations, including agreements. 
2. Agreements concluded at Community level shall be implemented either in accordance with the 
procedures and practices specific to management and labour and the Member States or, in matters 
covered by Article 137, at the joint request of the signatory parties, by a Council decision on a 
proposal from the Commission […]’  
This implies a strong element of subsidiarity of which sub-national public authorities can only 
dream—namely, the drafting of (quasi-)legislative proposals is left over to the social partners if they 
desire so. They can opt to implement the agreement ‘voluntary’—i.e. the terms of the agreement ‘will 
bind their members and will affect only them and only in accordance with the practices and procedures 
specific to them in their respective Member States’
25—or they can opt for implementation via Council 
decision, in which case the agreement will have a generally binding character (erga omnes procedure) 
and will become part of Community law.
26 
 Nevertheless, this horizontal decentralism is limited to the fields of European social policy, and its 
effect is strongly limited in practice due to lack of counterbalancing power between management and 
labour at the European level.
27  Moreover, the normative argument on the need to develop a European 
social dialogue has mainly been expressed in terms of the desirability to develop a European social 
dimension, i.e. in terms of output-legitimacy provided by a particular policy rather than in terms of 
participatory procedures. In this way, the discourse on horizontal decentralism remained confined to a 
particular policy sector and was not linked to the broader debate on democratic governance of the EU. 
The same can be said of another element of decentralism that entered into European discourse 
during the late 1980s, namely the principle of partnership. This principle has been introduced by the 
reform of the Structural Funds in 1988.  
Originally meanly aimed at increasing the involvement of regional and local authorities in the 
implementation of the structural funds policy—and thus as an element of vertical decentralism—the 
concept has gradually also been used to stress the need for the involvement of civil society actors. In 
the 1993 revision of the Structural Funds regulation, for instance, partnership is described as an 
approach consisting in ‘close consultations between the Commission, the Member States concerned 
and the competent authorities and bodies—including within the framework of each Member State’s 
                                                      
24  The consulted organisations are those that are part of a list, established by the Commission with criteria set out in a 
Commission Communication on the application of the Social Agreement (COM (93) 600 final). The list is currently 
composed of 44 European confederations of management and labour, either organised at cross-sectoral or sectoral level. 
25  COM (93) 600 final, point 37. On the different implications of this option according to the Member States, see A. Jacobs, 
1998. ‘From the Belgian National Labour Council to the European Social Dialogue’, in: C. Engels and M. Weiss, (eds.), 
Labour Law and Industrial Relations at the Turn of the Century. Liber Amicorum in Honour of Roger Blanpain, The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, pp. 305-328. 
26  S. Sciarra, 1996. ‘Collective Agreements in the Hierarchy of European Community Sources’, in: P. Davies, A. Lyon-Caen, S. 
Sciarra, and S. Simitis, (eds.), European Community Labour Law: Principles and Perspectives, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 204. 
27  W. Streeck and P.C. Schmitter, 1991. ‘From National Corporatism to Transnational Pluralism: Organized Interests in the 
Single European Market’, Politics and Society, 19 (2), pp. 133-164; and W. Streeck, 1996. ‘Neo-voluntarism: A New 
European Social Policy Regime’, in: G. Marks, F. W. Scharpf, P. C. Schmitter and W. Streeck, Governance in the 
European Union, London: Sage, pp. 64-94. The EU’s Schizophrenic Constitutional Debate: Vertical and Horizontal Decentralism in European Governance. 
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national rules and current practices, the economic and social partners, designated by the Member State at 
national, regional, local or other level with all parties acting as partners in pursuit of a common goal.’
28  
However, even more than for the social dialogue the partnership principle has been shaped by the 
research for efficiency within a particular policy sector,
29 inspired by the ‘new’ paradigm in territorial 
politics to encourage indigenous development of regions rather than financing large-scale 
infrastructure.
30 For the Commission partnership was meant to be a tool in developing direct relations 
with the sub-national level, bypassing the national one.
31 Moreover, while subsidiarity has been 
defined in the Treaty in a way to protect the Member States from too much European intervention—
and thus to drive back the Commission—the principle of partnership may appear as a way for the 
Commission to come in via the back door by encouraging a ‘governance approach’ enabling 
administrative and public-private interaction with the central European administration.
32 
It is only by the end of the 1990s that the horizontal dimension obtains a central place in the 
normative debate on European governance, via a discourse on the role of civil society organisations in 
European policy-making.
33 Initially the idea of ‘civil dialogue’ had been confined, just like the 
concepts of social dialogue and partnership, to a particular policy sector. The concept of ‘civil 
dialogue’ was proposed in 1996 by the Commission Directorate General responsible for social affairs 
to stress the need for stronger relations with NGOs in the social sector. Such a strengthened dialogue 
with non-profit and welfare organisations should complement the already well-established dialogue 
with the social partners. Encouraging such a dialogue was a welcome and rather innocent activity for a 
Commission that had been criticised for too pro-active interventions in the social policy sphere in the 
beginning of the 1990s.
34 Moreover, the Commission hoped to build through civil dialogue a 
supportive network for future social policy initiatives. 
It is only in the context of the Commission’s White Paper on European Governance that the use of the 
concept of civil dialogue and civil society has been broadened and become part of the general legitimacy 
debate. In the context of the legitimacy crisis of international institutions (brought to the public’s attention 
by civil society organisations),
35 and in reply to the legitimacy crisis of the European Institutions and of the 
Commission in particular, the discourse on civil society has become part of the Commission’s project for 
administrative reform, as well as its attempt to legitimate itself and its functions. 
The concept is no longer the tool of one particular Directorate of the Commission, but is used by 
the Commission as a whole. It is no longer limited to stressing the need for interactions with NGOs in 
the social sphere but is said to be a key for administrative reform of the entire Commission. On the one 
                                                      
28  Council Regulation 2081/93 OJ 1993 L193/5, Article 4 (1). 
29  L. Hooghe, 1996. ‘Building a Europe with the Regions: The Changing Role of the European Commission’, in: L. Hooghe, 
(ed.), Cohesion Policy and European Integration. Building Multi-level Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 113. 
30  R. Y. Nanetti, 1996. ‘EU Cohesion and Territorial Restructuring in the Member States’, in: L. Hooghe, (ed.), Cohesion 
Policy and European Integration. Building Multi-level Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 59-88.  
31  L. Hooghe, 1996, pp. 89-127.   
32  See also H. Heinelt, 1997. ‘What Happened to the Commission’s Partnership Approach?’, paper presented at the Conference 
Territorial Politics in Europe: A Zero-Sum Game?, European University Institute, Florence 21 and 22 April 1997. 
33   For an in-depth analysis, see S. Smismans, 2003. ‘European Civil Society; Shaped by Discourses and Institutional 
Interests’,  European Law Journal, 9 (4), pp. 482-504. 
34  J. Kendall and H. K. Anheier, 1999, p. 294. 
35  By the end of the 1990s NGO activity and social movements caught the attention of the media with the massive and 
‘heated’ manifestations during the summits of the world leaders, contesting the legitimacy of international decision-
making structures: first at the global trade and WTO summits (in Seattle, Sidney, and Davos), and subsequently also at 
the European summits (in Nice and Göteborg). It is not by accident that from 1998 onwards, the Commission’s DG for 
trade starts to organise ad hoc meetings with NGOs in order ‘to explain to the worried people that there was nothing to 
worry about’, R. Goehring, (forthcoming). ‘Interest Representation and Civil Society Formation’, in: A. Warleigh and J. 
Fairbrass, (eds.), Integrating Interests in the European Union: The New Politics of Persuasion, Advocacy and Influence. Stijn Smismans 
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hand, the Commission stresses the need for increased interaction with ‘civil society organisations’, on 
the other hand, it uses the concept to legitimate is own institutional position pointing to the many 
different forms of interaction with civil society organisations it has already established. As a 
consequence, by using the concept as a tool of legitimisation, it is defined in ever-broader terms, 
which may include also the Commission’s contacts with private firms, its interaction with scientific 
experts or with national administrations.  
2.3. The Two-Track Normative Debate and Institutional Interests 
Both vertical and horizontal decentralism have thus found a place in the normative debate on the European 
construction. Yet, mainly in separation from one another. On the one hand, ‘the democratic deficit debate’ 
that developed in particular in the context of the Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC) post Single 
European Act, has focused on the vertical dimension, paying attention to national and sub-national 
(parliamentary) representation and to subsidiarity in territorial terms. On the other hand, an initially more 
‘efficiency-driven’ approach to the involvement of the social partners and civil society organisations has 
led to the recognition of an element of ‘horizontal subsidiarity’ in favour of the social partners and an 
explicit normative discourse on civil society involvement in the context of the ‘governance debate’. 
The separation of these discourses on vertical and horizontal decentralism can be linked to ‘institutional 
interests’. Thus it comes as no surprise that IGCs focus on the vertical dimension, given that the actors in 
the debate are representatives from the Member States, i.e. representatives from governments elected on a 
territorial basis. The same applies to the more recent ‘constitutional technique’ of a Convention, used first 
to draft the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and then for the Constitutional Treaty. Most 
participants in the Convention have a—national or European—elected mandate.
36  
The reluctance of territorial representatives towards horizontal decentralism can be illustrated by 
the position of the European Parliament and the Committee of the Regions on the civil society 
discourse that emerged with the White Paper on European Governance. In its comments on the 
Commission’s White Paper on European Governance, the EP stressed that ‘the involvement of both 
the European and national parliaments constitutes the basis for a European system with democratic 
legitimacy’, and that ‘organised civil society […] whilst important, are (sic) inevitably sectoral and 
cannot be regarded as having its own democratic legitimacy.’
 37 According to the Commission, the EP 
‘was particularly keen no to grant civil society organisations a role which, either wholly or in part, was 
that of those holding political responsibility and who were elected by universal suffrage.’
38 Yet, the EP 
itself has well-developed contacts with civil society organisations. The EP is, for instance, seen as very 
receptive to the demands of the NGO sector.
39 However, these contacts are not defined as participatory 
                                                      
36  The second Convention has been composed of representatives of the Heads of Governments of the Member States and 
candidate countries, of the national parliaments and of the European Parliament, in addition to two representatives from 
the Commission. The ESC had three representatives as observers, the CoR six, the social partners three and the 
Ombudsman one. Civil society has been given an opportunity to make its voice heard via the online Forum and via 
‘contact groups’ with the Presidium of the Convention. Although civil society organisations felt initially relatively 
satisfied with this involvement, satisfaction strongly decreased as soon as the Convention started the phase of drafting the 
constitutional text. See also, S. Smismans, 2004. Law, Legitimacy and European Governance. Functional Participation 
in Social Regulation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Chapter 3. In relation to the first Convention it has been argued 
that the consultation of civil society organisations in ‘hearings’ and their informal involvement via email contributions 
and contacts with Convention members may—even if not influential—have contributed to the outcome (in that case the 
Charter) being seen as representative of the common European values; see F. Deloche-Gaudez, 2001. The Convention on 
a Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Method for the Future?, Notre Europe Research and Policy Paper No.15. 
37  ‘EP Resolution on the Commission White Paper on European governance’, A5-0399/2001, points 8 and 11a. 
38  Report from the Commission on European Governance, 2003, p.16. 
39  See for instance, with regard to environmental and consumer associations, J. Greenwood, 1997. Representing Interests in 
the European Union. London: Macmillan, pp. 191 and 203. The EU’s Schizophrenic Constitutional Debate: Vertical and Horizontal Decentralism in European Governance. 
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structures providing legitimacy.
40 They are but sources of information to the parliamentarians whose 
democratic legitimacy resides in their electoral mandate. This electoral mandate also allows 
parliamentarians the broad discretion to consult who they want. The EP has always opted to allow 
parliamentarians fairly unrestricted liberty in their interactions with socio-economic and civil society 
actors, imposing only a minimal set of standards to ensure ‘smart’ and ‘clean’ lobbying practices.
41  
The Committee of the Regions (COR) also remains particularly silent on the issues of civil society 
and civil dialogue. Composed of representatives from regional and local authorities,
42 it prefers to 
make use of a discourse on subsidiarity, ‘proximity’ and ‘closeness to the people’,
43 rather than 
stressing the role of civil society organisations. In fact, local and regional authorities often have well-
established relations with civil society organisations, since they are the most natural direct 
interlocutors for grass roots organisations. The COR is also perfectly aware of this fact and uses it as 
legitimisation for its proper role. However, the COR has avoided recognising the ‘democratic 
credentials’ of civil society organisations, stressing the unique role of territorially elected 
representatives in democracy. Although the COR ‘supports the Commission’s intention for wide-
ranging consultation of the representatives of civil society’, it ‘thinks that the democratic legitimacy of 
representatives elected by direct universal suffrage must not be confused with the greater involvement 
of NGOs and other arrangements for the representation of individual interests within society.’
44  
In contrast to the institutions with a territorially based elected mandate, the European Commission 
and the European Economic and Social Committee (ESC) have been the key actors in developing a 
normative discourse on civil society participation in European governance. For both institutions the 
recognition of the ‘legitimating potential’ of interaction with civil society would have a spill-over 
effect on their own institutional position, given that within the European institutional set-up these two 
institutions have a particular role in connecting with civil society organisations. Their discourse 
introduces elements of ‘participatory democracy’, defined as the possibility for those concerned by the 
decision to participate in the decision-making process. These elements of ‘participatory democracy’ 
are said to complement ‘representative democracy’, which resides in the electoral mandate of the 
parliament. Reshaping in this way the normative framework for EU democracy, the Commission and the 
ESC become less dependent on the Parliament as unique source of legitimisation. For the Commission 
the civil society discourse was a welcome tool to reply to the critics on the Brussels’ bureaucracy and in 
particular to the legitimacy crisis which hurt the Santer Commission. Reframing the legitimacy debate in 
terms of participatory democracy the Commission becomes a key source of legitimisation given its 
central role in consultation procedures interpreting ‘the general European interest’. 
For the European Economic and Social Committee the discourse is useful to redefine its proper role, 
given the risk of being marginalized within the European institutional framework due to the creation of a 
                                                      
40  Through its contacts with civil society organisations the EP has acted as an advocate for ‘European citizenship’ although 
not for ‘European civil society’ or ‘civil dialogue’.  See for instance, J. Vogel, 1999, ‘Le Parlement européen face à 
l’émergence d’une société civile européenne’, in: P. Delwit, J. M. De Waele, and P. Magnette, (eds.), A quoi sert le 
Parlement européen?, Bruxelles: Ed. Complexe, pp. 199-219. 
41  See B. Kohler-Koch, 1997. ‘Organized Interests in the EC and the European Parliament’, European Integration online 
Papers (EIoP), 1 (9), available on: http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-009a.htm; and T. Schaber, 1998. ‘The Regulation of 
Lobbying at the European Parliament: the Quest for Transparency’, in: P. H. Clayes, C. Gobin, I. Smets, and P. Winand, 
(eds.), Lobbying, Pluralism and European Integration. Brussels: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, pp. 208-221. For the 
EP, the issue of lobbying became above all linked to the financial status of parliamentarians, namely the need for each 
parliamentarian to declare remunerated activities and any gifts or payments received in connection with their mandate, 
whereas the Commission linked the question of lobbying much more with the issue of transparency of its work as a 
fundamental aspect of democratic governance. 
42  The Nice Treaty introduced the explicit requirement that COR members need to have an electoral mandate. 
43  For example, ‘COR Resolution on The outcome of the 2000 Intergovernmental Conference and the discussion on the future of 
the European Union’, 4 April 2001, CdR 430/2000 fin; and ‘COR Report on Proximity’, 6 November 2001, CdR 436/2000. 
44  Ibid, indent 3.2. Stijn Smismans 
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myriad of other advisory committees and the development of a social dialogue outside the Committee.
45 
The Committee has therefore stressed that it represents (and will also better represent) other civil society 
organisations in addition to the social partners. Referring to the legitimacy problem of the EU, it argues 
that—as the only Treaty based institution representing civil society organisations—it plays an important 
role as forum of organised civil society, which provides an additional source of legitimacy, in 
complement to the legitimacy provided by the representation of citizens via the European Parliament.
46  
The institutional interests of both the Commission and the ESC have shaped the discourse on the 
role of civil society organisations in a particular way. Thus the interaction between public authority 
and civil society organisations has above all been related to the Community method of policy-making 
in which the roles of the Commission and the ESC are most strongly established. More precisely, the 
Commission and the ESC pay above all attention to the involvement of civil society organisations in 
the drafting of new policy measures. 
However, the involvement of civil society organisations in policy-making is a multi-level reality; 
not only limited to the drafting at the central European level of new policy-measures (under the 
Community method). Even under the Community method one should also take into account their role in 
implementation, and their involvement at different territorial tiers of policy-making. Moreover, they 
equally play a role within intergovernmental procedures or within new policy instruments such as the 
Open Method of Coordination. Regarding the latter, policy instruments (drafted by the Commission) 
have more recently and increasingly stressed the need for ‘a fully decentralised approach’ and the 
importance of civil society involvement,
47 but the precise interaction between this policy discourse and 
the civil society discourse and initiatives introduced on basis of the White will need further clarification. 
2.4. Decentralism and the Current Constitutional Debate 
The split nature of the normative discourses on the European polity—and the importance of 
decentralism therein—is reflected in the current constitutional debate. This debate takes place on two 
fronts; on the one hand, there is the follow-up of the debate on European governance resulting from 
the Commission’s White Paper; on the other hand, there is the Convention and IGC debate on the 
Constitutional Treaty.  While both the ‘White Paper follow-up’ and the Constitutional Treaty debate 
pay attention to the vertical and the horizontal dimension, the first still priviliges the horizontal 
dimension whereas the second focuses on the vertical dimension. Moreover, as far as they pay 
attention to the two dimensions, none of them provides a clear normative map on how vertical and 
horizontal decentralism are and should be interrelated in a multi-level polity.  
2.4.1. The Follow-Up to the White Paper 
As argued above the White Paper has placed the horizontal dimension in the core of the legitimacy 
debate of the EU. As a follow-up to its discourse on civil society involvement the Commission has 
adopted ‘General Principles and Minimum Standards for Consulting Non-institutional Interested 
Parties’
48 which provide inter alia for a period of at least eight weeks for responses, issuing 
confirmation of receipt, and displaying of the results of public consultation on the Internet. It has, 
                                                      
45  For a more extensive account of this argument, see S. Smismans, 2000. ‘The European Economic and Social Committee: 
towards deliberative democracy via a functional assembly’, European Integration online Papers, 4 (12), available at: 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-012a.htm 
46  ESC, Own-initiative opinion on the role and contribution of civil society organisations in building Europe, adopted on 
22-23 September 1999. 
47  See also, S. Smismans, (forthcoming). ‘Reflexive Law in Support of Directly Deliberative Polyarchy: Reflexive-Deliberative 
Polyarchy as a Normative Frame for the OMC’, in S. Deakin and O. De Schutter, (eds.), Social Rights and Market Forces: Is 
the Open Coordination of Employment and Social Policies the Future of Social Europe?. Brussels: Bruylant. 
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moreover, created a database ‘CONECCS’ (‘Consultation, the European Commission and Civil 
Society’) on the EUROPA server, which provides an overview of Community advisory structures and 
a non-exhaustive list of NGOs active at the European level.
49  
In addition to instruments and principles to consult civil society organisations, the White Paper also 
suggested the possibility of co-regulation with and self-regulation by civil society actors. Yet, one may 
wonder why these elements of ‘horizontal subsidiarity’ have only been dealt with under the title of 
‘better regulation’ without making an explicit link to the normative ‘civil society discourse’ focusing 
on consultation procedures.
50 First, it may not be in the Commission’s institutional interest to plaid 
strongly in favour of delegating regulatory powers to civil society actors. Second, normative narratives 
about co-regulation with and self-regulation by non-public entities remain underdeveloped and may 
not be the easiest way to sell European governance as legitimate. In fact, in their reaction to the White 
paper, the other institutional players—the European Parliament in particular—have been reticent to co-
regulation and soft-regulation and considered further examination is required.
51 As a consequence, the 
Commission’s legitimating discourse on civil society, and even more general the European debate on 
horizontal decentralism, remains mainly confined to the issue of consultation, and more particular to 
consultation at European level. Both the General Principles and CONECCS address above all European 
associations, neglecting largely the (vertical) multi-level character of organised civil society in Europe. 
While acknowledged in particular for its focus on the horizontal dimension, the White Paper did 
pay also some attention to vertical decentralism. Under the title ‘Reaching out to citizens through 
regional and local democracy’ the White Paper pleads in favour of ‘a systematic dialogue with 
European and national associations of regional and local government’, a more active role for the CoR 
(for instance through the preparation of exploratory reports in advance of Commission proposals, or 
by organising the exchange of best practice among sub-national authorities), increased attention to 
assessing the territorial impact of EU sectoral policies, and the possibility to sign ‘tripartite contracts’ 
between the Commission, the Member States and regions and localities to ensure better 
implementation of European policies. However, the White Paper pays attention to the vertical 
dimension by addressing the relation between EU level and sub-national public authorities, but it 
neglects the horizontal dimension that may take place at that level; contrary to some of the preparatory 
work that had been done for the White Paper. 
The White Paper’s Working Group on ‘Decentralisation. Better Involvement of National, Regional 
and Local Actors’
52 had, contrary to what the name of the working group may suggest, given a broad 
interpretation of ‘decentralisation’, namely in both vertical and horizontal terms. Decentralisation is a 
‘process that involves a wide range of actors in shaping policy, increasing responsibility at various levels 
that can be coupled with greater flexibility in implementation.’ ‘Involvement should include national and 
sub-national governmental entities as well as a wide spectrum of non-governmental representative 
stakeholders.’ The ESC and the COR are equally treated as possible channels for this involvement. It 
was also the Working Group on Decentralisation that made the suggestion to use tripartite contracts to 
improve ‘co-operation with decentralised territorial entities as well as functionally decentralised entities 
which have responsibilities for implementing EU policies and law’.  The initial proposal of the Working 
Group for such a contractual approach to implementation included also civil society organisations as 
                                                      
49  The database is described as ‘a directory of non-profit civil society organisations’, but includes also private interest 
organisations such as the World Federation of Advertisers, the European Demolition Association or the Banking 
Federation of the European Union. The inclusion in the database does not imply an accreditation system. 
50  White Paper on European Governance, COM (2001) 428 final, of 25/7/2001, p. 21; and Commission Communication‚ 
Action plan Simplifying and improving the regulatory environment’, COM (2002) 278 final, of 5/6/2002, p.11-13. 
51  Report from the Commission on European Governance (2003), Annex I – The Public Consultation, p.36. 
52  Report from Working Group 3b, Decentralisation. Better Involvement of National, Regional and Local Actors, June 2001. Stijn Smismans 
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potential contractors. Yet, this horizontal dimension has disappeared in the White Paper and in the 
follow-up Communication on Tripartite Contracts
53 which define the contracts only in vertical terms. 
The only trace of a link between vertical and horizontal decentralism could be found in the White 
Paper’s attention for ‘connecting with networks’. The Commission acknowledges the existence of 
networks that link business, communities, research centres and regional and local authorities, but which 
feel often disconnected from the EU policy process. The White Paper proposes to support these networks, 
in particular regional and city networks that strengthen transnational and cross-border co-operation. 
2.4.2. The Convention and IGC Debate on the Constitutional Treaty 
The European Council Summit in Laeken (14/15 December 2001) convened the European Convention 
on the future of Europe
54 which was asked to draw up proposals ‘to bring citizens closer to the European 
design and European Institutions, […] to organise politics and the European political area in an enlarged 
Union, and […] to develop the Union into a stabilising factor and a model in the new world order.’
55 
The Convention and IGC debate has largely been dominated by the need to ensure a ‘workable 
institutional solution’ in the light of future enlargement.
56 The focus has been on the main Community 
Institutions, reconsidering their composition and powers, their inter-institutional relations, and the way 
in which power relations among Member States should be structured within them. Put differently, the 
territorial dimension has prevailed over the horizontal one. The idea of horizontal decentralism has 
been nearly entirely absent in the debate. 
Moreover, also regarding the territorial dimension, the idea of territorial decentralism has mainly 
been interpreted in a restrictive way, focusing on the relation between the Union and the Member 
States, strengthening the position of the Council, and stressing the need for a better delineation of EU 
competences to safeguard national competencies. 
Two articles introduce the sub-national territorial dimension, but the main focus on the 
Community-Member States relation is never far away.  Thus Article I-5 states that ‘the Union shall 
respect the quality of Member States before the Constitution as well as their national identities, 
inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local 
self-government’(stress added). However, this means primarily a recognition of the Member States’ 
autonomy in organising regional and local government, rather than the recognition of these territorial 
levels in se. It is worth to note that Title VI of the Constitutional Treaty, which defines ‘the democratic 
life of the Union’ does not explicitly mention the role of regional and local authorities. Although 
Article I-45 states that ‘decisions shall be taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the 
citizen’, the principle of representative democracy on which the Union is founded is only defined with 
reference to the role of the European Parliament, and the representation of the Member States in the 
European Council and the Council of Ministers by their governments, themselves accountable to their 
national parliament. Representative democracy at regional and local level is not mentioned. 
More innovative is the formulation of the subsidiarity principle, which recognises the sub-national 
level. According to Article I-9 al.3 ‘under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its 
exclusive competence the Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the intended action 
                                                      
53  Commission Communication, A Framework for target-based tripartite contracts and agreements between the Community, 
the States and regional and local authorities, COM (2002) 709 final, of 11/12/2002. 
54  http://www.europa.eu.int/futurum/index_en.htm 
55   The Laeken declaration itself resulted from a Declaration added to the Nice Treaty which had urged the European 
Council to present at its meeting in Laeken a declaration regarding further institutional reform of the Union. 
56  The references are to the Provisional Consolidated version of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution of Europe (CIG 
86/04 of 25 June 2004), made available by the Secretariat General of the Council after the IGC Summit of 18 June 2004 
agreed on the Constitutional Treaty. The EU’s Schizophrenic Constitutional Debate: Vertical and Horizontal Decentralism in European Governance. 
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cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, 
but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.’   
The ‘Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality’,
57 to be 
annexed to the Constitutional Treaty, also mentions that the Commission, which has to consult widely 
before proposing legislative acts, should, where appropriate, take into account the regional and local 
dimension of the action envisaged. However, the Protocol has identified above all the national 
parliaments as the ‘watchdogs’ of the principle of subsidiarity by introducing a new ex ante political 
monitoring mechanism through which any national parliament or any chamber of a national 
parliament will be enabled to issue a reasoned opinion regarding compliance with the principle by 
proposals of a legislative nature. Where reasoned opinions on a Commission’s proposal’s non-
compliance with the principle of subsidiarity represent at least one third of all the votes allocated to 
national parliaments and their chambers,
58 the Commission shall review its proposal—although, after 
such review, it may still decide to maintain the proposal. It will be for each national parliament or each 
chamber to consult, where appropriate, regional parliaments with legislative powers. The latter are 
thus not directly allowed to issue a reasoned opinion.
59 
Regions (even with legislative powers) and local authorities are neither allowed to act before the 
Court of Justice in case of infringement of the principle of subsidiarity. According to the Protocol, this 
right is the privilege of the Member States, and of the Committee of the Regions ‘as regards legislative 
acts for the adoption of which the Constitution provides that it be consulted’. 
While the horizontal dimension remains entirely absent in the new definition of subsidiarity, which 
sticks to a purely territorial interpretation (that still ensures in particular the compentencies of the national 
level, even if integrating some recognition of the sub-national one), some traces of horizontal decentralism 
can be found in the Draft Constitution’s description of ‘the democratic life of the European Union’.  
According to Article I-47 ‘the European Union recognises and promotes the role of the social 
partners at Union level, taking into account the diversity of national systems; it shall facilitate dialogue 
between the social partners, respecting their autonomy’. Moreover, Article I-46 introduced the 
principle of participatory democracy, which implies that ‘the Union Institutions shall maintain an 
open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society’. 
While the explicit introduction into the Constitutional Treaty of an article on ‘participatory 
democracy’, including ‘civil dialogue’, may surprise, given the composition of the Convention and the 
IGC (namely, elected representatives), one should add that the Convention hasn’t provided any new 
procedures to bring horizontal decentralism beyond the mere level of ‘principle’; neither in terms of 
developing a multi-level industrial relations system,
60 nor in terms of creating rights of participation 
and spaces for self-regulation for civil society organisations. Moreover, like the White Paper (follow-
up) debate, the Convention has failed to see the link between horizontal and vertical decentralism. 
                                                      
57  CIG 86/04 ADD1 of 28 June 2004. 
58  The national Parliaments of Member States with unicameral Parliamentary systems shall have two votes, while each of 
the chambers of a bicameral Parliamentary system shall have one vote. 
59   Although the Protocol does not allow regions with legislative powers to issue a reasoned opinion, they can do so 
indirectly if they agree within the Second Chamber.  It is worth to note that the final version of the Protocol is stronger in 
this sense than the previous drafts. Originally only ‘national parliaments’ were said to be able to issue reasoned opinions, 
while urged to organise internally the consultation of each chamber in the case of parliamentary parliaments. The final 
version allows a Second Chamber to issue a reasoned opinion even if the First Chamber does not agree.  
60   Regarding the potential and difficulties to develop a multi-level industrial relations system within the EU, see B. 
Bercusson, 1999. ‘Democratic Legitimacy and European Labour Law’, Industrial Law Journal, 28 (2), pp. 153-170; A. 
Lo Faro,1999. Funzioni e finzioni della contrattazione colletiva comunitaria. Milano: Giuffrè Editore; and M. Biagi, 
2000, ‘The European Monetary Union and Industrial Relations’, The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law 
and Industrial Relations, 16 (1), pp. 39-45. Stijn Smismans 
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2.4.3. Towards an Integrated Constitutional Debate? 
The White Paper debate and the Constitutional Treaty debate have been set on track by different actors 
and have different aims. The Convention and IGC had to prepare the Treaty revisions that would 
adjust the European institutional set-up to the challenges of the future, in particular enlargement. The 
White Paper had the aim to change the governance style of the Commission without having to wait for 
Treaty reforms. With the White Paper the Commission had mainly the aim to rebuild its own 
legitimacy, making also recourse to the concept of ‘governance’ to avoid that the issues would be 
defined as ‘constitutional’ and therefore more contested. 
However, there are good reasons to argue that the two debates should be more strongly related to 
each other. First, because the White Paper addresses constitutional issues as much as the Convention. 
It addresses the basic institutional set-up and fundamental principles of the European polity such as 
horizontal decentralism or the principle of transparency. Second, changes deemed necessary by the 
White Paper should not be condemned by the straitjacket of the existing Treaty. 
To a limited extent the Convention debate has picked up some issues of the White Paper debate, such 
as the introduction of the principle of participatory democracy. However, the constitutional debate for a 
complex multi-level polity as the EU should far more take into account that the vertical and the horizontal 
dimension are interlinked. As will be analysed in the next section, vertical and horizontal decentralism are 
no separate realities; and therefore, should not be dealt with in separate constitutional discourses. 
3. Vertical and Horizontal Decentralism: Intertwined Realities 
The normative debate on decentralism in European governance contrasts with reality; contrary to what the 
twin-track normative debate seems to suggest, processes of vertical and horizontal decentralism are 
intertwined. Policy-making is increasingly characterised by division of power over (and interaction 
between) different territorial levels and by a blurring of the distinction between public and private realms.
61  
The second half of the twentieth century has been characterised by an ever increasing involvement 
of the State in more and more domains in society. The Western European welfare state developed in 
the framework of a State with a well-defined territorial constituency and a hierarchically structured 
public authority.  Nevertheless, in contrast to the ‘classical’ Weberian assumption of a ‘neutral 
bureaucracy’,
62 public administration increasingly interacted with private and civil society 
organisations. The range of issues over which government took responsibility meant that in practical 
terms it is not possible for all such matters to be dealt with through detailed legislation (being the 
outcome of parliamentary politics) which is then simply applied to the concrete case by a neutral 
bureaucracy.
63 In the Western European countries interactions between public authority and civil 
society intermediaries have mainly taken the form of corporatist settings in which a fixed and limited 
number of encompassing organisations (mainly representing management and labour) negotiate with 
state agencies.
64 The ‘territorial constituency’ of these encompassing civil society organisations 
corresponded mostly with the State territory, and their hierarchical internal structure allowed for 
macro-economic concertation with public authority. In this concertation, public authority retained a 
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central position, without dispersing authority over multiple functional units.  Therefore, while it would 
be wrong to describe the State in past-world-war II Europe in monolithical terms,
65 one could still 
relatively easily identify public authority with the State—representing both well-defined territory and 
hierarchy—and the public and private realms could be distinguished. 
This is no longer the case today. The nature of policy-making and public authority in Western 
(European) democracies has changed importantly over the past couple of decades. The relationship, which 
could long be upheld within nation-states, between territorial constituencies and functional fields of activity 
is disappearing.
66 The identification of public authority with the State has become more problematic due to 
processes of globalisation, the complex policy-making demands in a ‘post-industrial society’, the end of 
Keynesian politics to the benefit of neo-liberalism, the shift from redistributive social/welfare governance 
to more market oriented governance, and the popularity of ‘deregulation’ since the 1980s. 
‘Deregulation’ has not meant less regulation, it signifies only that the State has retreated or has 
partially retreated from regulating in certain domains, whereas State regulation increased in other 
domains or has been taken over by semi-public or private authorities.
67  The issues in which the State 
intervenes, as well as the extent to and the mode in which it intervenes have changed.  Partially 
because of the technical nature of some issues, the State has increasingly delegated authority to 
independent administrative authorities, semi-public institutions, central banks, private standardisation 
organisations.
68 While encompassing social partners’ organisations retain a certain role, public 
authority has developed multiple interactions with other civil society organisations with different 
sectoral and territorial constituencies. Moreover, there is an increasing tendency to leave a self-
regulatory space to certain parts of civil society.
69 Power is more dispersed,
70 and policy-making can 
be increasingly described in terms of ‘policy networks’, i.e. structures of governance involving private 
and state actors linked together through varying degrees of resource dependencies that determine 
which actors dominate the network and how decisions are made.
71  
We have been witnessing a development from a ‘command and control’ type of state towards an 
‘enabling’ state, a model in which the state is not proactively governing society but is more concerned 
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71  Renate Maynts argues how interorganisational networks, such as policy-networks, are not merely a discovery by social 
scientists of an already existing reality, but a more general phenomenon of structural change in modern societies.  See R. 
Mayntz, 1991. Modernization and the Logic of Interorganizational Networks. Discussion Paper, Max-Planck-Institut 
Köln. For an example of policy network analysis, see R. A. W. Rhodes, 1997. Understanding Governance, Buckingham: 
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with defining objectives and mustering resources from a wide variety of sources to pursue those 
goals.
72 A common feature of the political project pursued by contemporary Western states has been to 
make state-centred societies less state-centred; recent institutional reform in different national contexts 
has aimed at opening up new patterns of interaction between authorities at different tiers of 
government and key actors in their external environment.
73 The increased interaction between public 
and private realms and the involvement of the latter in the provision of (semi-)public services cannot 
be looked at in entire separation from the increasing divergence of territorial tiers of government and 
governance. Research on the reform of public administration in Italy, for instance, revealed that 
processes of contracting out and outsourcing by public administrations to private or non-profit actors 
has gone hand in hand with territorial decentralisation to the benefit of local government.
74 In a 
comparable way, ‘welfare reform’ in Spain has been characterised by both a tendency to privatisation 
and to territorial decentralisation, with the latter having had the strongest influence.
75 Yet, horizontal 
decentralism is no automatic guarantee for vertical decentralism. Reform in public administration in the 
UK, for instance, revealed that contracting out and outsourcing has been accompanied by centralisation 
to the detriment of local government.
76 Whatever may be the precise interactions between the horizontal 
and the vertical dimensions of decentralism within the administrative reform processes within the 
European states, it is clear that they cannot be treated as entirely independent realities. 
Moreover these processes are not only taken place within the nation-states but are linked to growing 
globalisation and integration of certain sectors of social activity.
77  Some of the networks and the private 
realms in which regulation finds its source, are bypassing the territorial boundaries of the nation-state. 
Globalisation—not only in the economy, but also in science, culture, technology, transport etc.—seems 
to lead to legal pluralism. In multiple sectors of civil society rules are formulated independently of the 
laws of nation-states.
78 Policy-networks of public and private actors are thus woven over multiple 
territorial levels; the local, the regional, the national, the global, and—not at least—the European level. 
The European integration process has created an additional vertical tier of government; not an 
additional upper-level in the linear hierarchical structure of public authority, but a supra-national level 
interacting and interdependent with other territorial tiers of government. Thus one has talked about ‘a 
fusion of administrations’,
79 denoting the process of increased exchanges between partly autonomous 
but increasingly interdependent local, regional, national and European administrations. Moreover, this 
multi-level European governance is characterised by interactions and partnerships with civil society 
organisations and private actors at the various territorial levels, including in certain cases the transfer of 
authority to private or semi-public institutions, such as standardization bodies in health and safety issues, 
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or the social partners in labour law issues. Not surprisingly, policy network analysis has become a tool to 
analyse European policies such as the structural funds,
80 telecommunications and environmental policies. 
The reality of European governance thus shows a complexity that does not correspond with the 
linear separation of the vertical and horizontal dimensions of decentralism expressed in the 
(institutional) normative discourses.  
Several conclusions can be drawn from this finding: 
First, even at the analytical level we are in need of further research on the interactions between 
vertical and horizontal decentralism. Analyses of multi-level governance, for instance, have been pre-
dominantly focusing on the ‘multi-level’ aspects (relations between the territorial levels of 
government) of multi-level governance thereby neglecting the ‘governance’ component (relations 
between the public and private spheres),
81 whereas policy-network analyses tend rather to focus on 
public-private fusion without always taking into account the extra variable of different territorial tiers 
of government. While different analytical tools may provide particular lenses on reality, the 
confrontation of different angles of view allows for a more correct understanding of reality. 
Second, in particular in developing a normative discourse on how the European polity should best 
be structured, one cannot limit himself/herself to a design that only addresses a limited part of the 
complex reality. As argued by Jachtenfuchs ‘the political debate is in desperate need for models of the 
European polity which give a realistic analytical image of the EU and at the same time serve as 
normative guideposts for feasible reforms balancing democracy and governance.’
82 Any serious 
normative theory on European governance should, therefore, take account of both the horizontal and 
the vertical dimensions of decentralism and their relation. 
Third, if one argues in favour of on the one hand, giving priority to lower territorial levels, and on the 
other hand, involving civil society organisations in policy-making, there is no reason to limit the latter to 
the highest territorial level. If both vertical and horizontal decentralism is supposed to be important in 
European governance, there are no good arguments to justify the current tendency of the Community to 
limit its ‘civil society discourse’ to the Community method and interactions between (European) 
associations and the Commission (and the ESC). It is worth to note that one of the frequent comments on 
the White Paper from civil society organisations was the need to recognise the multi-level nature of 
European civil society, i.e. the Commission should not concentrate on transnational structures only.
83 
Fourth, if Community Institutions or political actors plead in favour of vertical and horizontal 
decentralism—by way of different institutional proposals—one may look how lower or smaller 
territorial and functional entities would benefit from it. Or put differently, from a bottom-up approach, 
one can ask whether the actors that may most directly profit from decentralism have conflicting 
interests or whether they can rather imagine strategic alliances.  
4. Conclusion  
Normative discourses on the European institutional set-up have paid attention to both vertical and 
horizontal decentralism. However, these two dimensions have appeared in the EU legitimacy debate on 
different moments and have been proposed by different institutional actors. The ‘democratic deficit 
debate’ hold during the IGC’s of the 1990s, and the normative discourses of institutions with an electoral 
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basis, have focused on elements of representation and subsidiarity in territorial terms, whereas the more 
recent ‘governance debate’, centred around the Commission (and the ESC) has focused on the horizontal 
dimension. This ‘schizophrenia’ is also characterising the current constitutional debate, split up between 
the Constitutional Treaty debate and the follow-up to the White Paper on European Governance.  
This split between the vertical and the horizontal dimension of decentralism does not correspond 
with the complex reality of multi-level governance in the European polity. The contradiction between 
the split discourses and the intertwined reality implies both an analytical and a normative challenge. 
Analytically, there is need for further research on the complex relationships between the vertical and 
the horizontal dimension, including such questions as how processes of vertical and horizontal 
decentralisation relate to each other, who—in institutional terms—are the ‘winners’ and the ‘losers’, 
and whether smaller/lower territorial and functional units have common interests or are competitors. 
Normatively, any serious constitutional design for the European polity should take into account the two 
dimensions and their intertwining. A normative discourse for the European institutional design that 
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